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Recent reports of cloned sheep in Scotland have raised 
questions concerning the proposed and future uses of cloning 
technology. From the media and its inclination toward headline news, 
to op-ed reflections by local medical and academic professionals, to 
backyard musings between neighbors, thoughts of the possibility of 
human clones express excited tension. The tension between the 
public's awareness of scientific reality and science fiction is blurred for 
the moment by news of successful cloning. Relief of this tension 
requires a scientifically accurate and ethically sensitive response to 
those who cannot keep current of the fast pace of techriological 
developments in biomedical researcfi.--Wliile tne prospect of elening 
ourselves or superheroes or villains remains fantastic (and either fun or 
frightening to speculate), here I focus on questions that directly concern 
those future possibilities at a level that addresses the stages that lead to 
that future. 
Many sectors of society are rightly concerned over the 
possibilities that cloning presents. The evening television news and the 
morning papers reported the breakthrough, recognizing an issue of 
ethics that had not been considered previously by the media, as had 
physician-assisted suicide or abortion. However, neither professional 
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ethicists nor magisterial authority have been remiss in exploring the 
ethical implications of applying this and similar technologies to the 
human species.' 
In this analysis I will temper some of the more sensational 
claims of the media with a serious and more realistic look at the 
realities of current technological possibilities and their probabilities. 
Second, I will present some of the concerns that an ethical perspective 
raises in matters that affect us personally and as a society. And third, 
I will consider how the possibilities of applying this technology to the 
human species squares with Church teaching on manipulation of human 
embryos. 
Headline News vs. Scientific Reality 
The media have sensationalized the possibilities of human 
cloning with questions of a cloned Michael Jordan or Renee Russo, or, 
as the population of South Florida might fear, Fidel Castro. While 
these are ambitious questions, they belie the scientific reality. Science, 
thus far, presents little likelihood that the genetic material from any of 
these individuals would in fact produce another of them. The 
technological reality produces neither photo-copy duplicates nor adults. 
The technology that produced "Dolly" took DNA from an adult and 
inserted it into an ovum, which had its genetic nucleus removed;2 the 
cytoplasmic material from the donor ovum remained and still 
influences the development of the inserted DNA and of ten month old 
(as of this writing) "Dolly". 3 Additionally, the environmental 
conditions which greatly influence the adults that human babies become 
- parents, siblings, order of birth, friends, neighborhood, culture, 
schools, teachers, financial stability, etc. - could not be duplicated. 
Thus, even if science attempted the fantastic by cloning a human being, 
we have no guarantee nor reason to believe that the clone would be 
anything like the characteristics we prize or fear in the original. 
I do not want to seem naive by not considering potential abuses 
of this technology. Many people, professional and lay, concentrate on 
possible abuses of technologies - the technological imperative must not 
be ignored, it drives the research scientist to questions. The scientist 
asks: "What happens when (not if) ... we insert, we deprive, we 
manipulate human genetic material?" The ethicists, on the other hand, 
November, 1997 47 
ask in response to. the research agenda: "What are we do.ing to. o.urselves 
with this o.r that actio.n o.r techno.lo.gical possibility, and why?" Further, 
if histo.rical precedents · indicate in any way future pro.babilities, the 
transitio.n fro.m fro.gs, mice, sheep, Co.ws, and mo.nkeys to. human beings 
is likely.4 Wo.uld the human clo.nes be develo.ped fo.r purpo.ses similar 
to. tho.se engaged by the agricultural industry to. pro.duce prime sto.ck? 
Beware, befo.re the clo.ning o.f human individuals beco.mes genuinely 
pro.bable, bo.th ethics and science need to. co.nsider establishing 
bo.undaries that wo.uld prohibit just such a sensatio.nal and Co.stly end. 
Caution: People are Subjects, not Objects 
One o.fthe co.ncerns o.fthe ethical project co.nsiders appropriate 
ways o.ftreating o.urselves individually and o.fbeing to.gether so.cially. 
One of these ways pro.hibits reducing perso.ns, who. are pro.perly 
subjects, to. o.bjects fo.r manipulative use o.r dispo.sal.5 The research 
techno.lo.gy o.f clo.ning makes the species under study the o.bject o.f its 
manipulatio.n interest. But, ,applying this techno.lo.gy to. the human 
species, human beings beco.me the o.bject o.f research manipulatio.n. 
That is, when we reduce o.urselves to. o.ur genetic material as clo.ning 
techno.lo.gy requires and subject "it" to. techno.lo.gical imperatives, we 
are o.bjectified. And, beco.ming the o.bject o.f manipulatio.n, we beco.me 
dispo.sable just like all the o.ther o.bjects o.f research. 
A related co.ncern arises o.ver artificial repro.ductive 
techno.lo.gies. Artificial means o.f repro.ductio.n have circumvented 
co.nditio.ns o.f infertility fo.r many hetero.sexual co.uples, single perso.ns, 
and gay wo.men and men who. have quite deliberately answered a call 
to. parentho.o.d. These techno.lo.gies manipulate the gametes (o.vum and 
sperm) of the spouses to.ward fertilizatio.n,-orintro.du~e the gametes o.f 
a do.no.r, o.r acquire bo.th gametes fro.m do.no.rs to. pro.duce an embryo.. 
The embryo.s, o.nce sufficiently develo.ped, are transferred to. the 
co.ntracting wo.man o.r surro.gate fo.r gestatio.n. In the do.no.r cases the 
genetic inheritance o.fthe embryo. is extra-familial. The po.ssibility o.f 
clo.ning o.neself may be an attractive alternative to. the do.no.r case fo.r 
perso.ns co.nsidering bo.th parentho.o.d and their genetic future as it co.uld 
be expressed in o.ffspring. Ho.wever, treating do.no.r and surro.gates in 
no.nperso.nal ways and o.nly as bearers o.f reproductive material that can 
be bo.ught affro.nts individual dignity by a reductio.n fro.m subject to. 
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object; treating other human beings via cloned genetic material affronts 
likewise. 
Consider this analogy, which addresses both objectification and 
disposal concerns: prostitutes are the objects of a client's sexual 
gratification. Prostitutes are explicitly devalued as persons by their 
clients and their pimps by the ways in which they are manipulated like 
objects in the market - being bought and sold. Prostitutes have been 
taught to believe that their bodies (by extension, their very selves) are 
the "goods"/objects for sale. When the "goods" are damaged or old or 
in any other way no longer gratifying, they are disposed of as so much 
unwanted or broken merchandise. The buying and selling of persons, 
whether for sex, surrogacy, genetic material, or any other kind of 
manipulation, is prostitution. 
The objectification of human genetic material for the express 
purpose of cloning another self prostitutes it (and the person that human 
genetic material becomes) by its progress toward unwarranted 
manipulation and disposal not unlike that of the aged prostitute. Many 
disapprove of prostitution because it is tantamount to the buying and 
selling of human flesh with the inherent devaluation of the person who, 
through prostitution, is reduced to an object, a market product. Many 
ought likewise disapprove of human cloning, which quite readily 
devolves into the marketing of those future cloned persons. Does the 
clone of an Elie Wiesel, a Jimmy Carter, a Mother Hale go to the 
highest bidder, for example? Do we want to be the buyers and sellers 
of persons in the guise of the clone? Do we really want to treat our 
(future) selves as products in this way? 
Juxtaposing Church Teaching 
The Church's Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its 
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (SCDF, 1987), Donum Vitae 
(1987), and The Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994) restate the 
teaching that human life begins and must be protected from the moment 
of conception. By juxtaposing this fairly consistent teaching (based on 
the scientific evidence available at a given point in history) onto the 
technological cloning of human embryos, a strict prohibition arises. 
The kind of reproduction cloning involves and the experimental 
procedures not directly therapeutic to the individual human embryo as 
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subject violate the sanctity of life in its origin and development. The 
teachings clearly distinguish therapeutic intervention from experimental 
manipulation or exploitation upon the embryo stages of fetal 
development. The technology of cloning human embryos v. adult 
genetic material would constitute manipulation certainly, exploitation 
probably. Industrial scale cloning of embryos for the purposes of 
gaining ever more accurate predictors of therapeutic progress would not 
be tolerated. The Church only allows therapeutic experimentation upon 
an embryo for the hopeful benefit of that particular embryo in its 
continued and successful development.6 However, the teachings do not 
prohibit experimentation on genetic material itself, in contradistinction 
to the embryo or the complete individual genome if it were to be 
artificially reproduced. Thus, the Church rejects the prospect of human 
cloning on the basis of the teaching on the sacral dignity of procreative 
activity between spouses and on the respect due the human life from the 
union of gametes (fertilization/conception) until death. 
On Limits and Alternatives 
Many already know that our species is quite marvelous, in fact 
human beings are technological wizards. I caution, however, that 
wizards are often portrayed as self-destructive. Nevertheless, wizardry 
that is right reasoning looks for and pursues activities that will 
contribute to human flourishing while avoiding those that jeopardize. 
Thus, in asking whether or not the prospect of human clones 
contributes to or jeopardizes the dignity of persons or the future of our 
communities, insight will be gained into the extent to which this 
technology should be applied. If I am correct that cloning human 
-genetic materi-al--far- the purp()ses of producing another individual is 
equal in intent to the buying and selling of persons, then that 
technology will eventually consume us and should not be so engaged. 
We will, in the bodies of our future clones, become products and 
persons no more. The future so envisioned would include a shopping 
market of clones as well as a stock option in the commodities trading 
market of the London, the New York, and the Tokyo Exchanges. 
I do not mean to suggest that cloning research in the human 
sphere should be stopped. However, boundaries must be established 
and alternative means considered which will address the medical 
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concerns that cloning research dares and presumes to remedy for the 
human species. Thus, set the limits of technological application 1) at 
the somatic (body cells) level of manipulation for experimental 
correction of pathologies, 2) at the germ-line (gamete cells) level to 
thwart a pathology's replication, and 3) at a research reserve level of 
cloned therapeutic cells, not embryos, for future intervention. But we 
should never allow the cloning of individuals - we ought not 9ispose 
ourselves to this kind of manufacture. Even Ian Wilmut, the Scottish 
scientist responsible for "Dolly", rejects the very thought of applying 
this technology to cloning people. 
Some of the alternative responses to consider against the 
manipUlative purposes proposed for the technology would allay fears 
over the sensational headlines and welcome an ethics respectful of 
persons today and tomorrow. For example, some suggest that human 
clones would solve problems of both organ availability and 
compatibility. We could more easily increase the pool of organ donors 
through capital ad campaigns or other such devices and incentive 
programs to broaden the availability and subsequent likelihood of 
compatibility. Others suggest that human clones would guarantee a 
genetic continuity of descendants or a genetically engineered and 
superior next generation. We could decrease insistence on genetically 
related offspring by increasing the popularity and ease of adoption to 
satisfy the call to be parent; any other reason for wanting a child is 
morally suspect. We should deny any actively biotechnical 
interventionist eugenics program for its inherent discriminatory 
prejudice which assumed the truth-validity of a socially dependent 
construct of superiority. Finally, still others suggest that a bevy of 
identical cloned embryos would facilitate research reliability and 
increase experimentally therapeutic success. We could continue 
research in genetic manipulation and cellular intervention for the 
therapeutic relief of disformed genes with a reserve of cells yielding 
similar experimental results yet without the indignity inherent in the 
embryo category of research. The technological genie of cloning is out 
of the bottle; the genie must be minded with prudence. 
If we are genuinely interested in our future we must be 
intentional now about fashioning the stages leading to the future and 
that future itself in a way that attends to both the people we are and the 
people we want to become. To go about our business as if tomorrow 
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will take care of itself, neither attending to the stages that lead to 
tomorrow or the kinds of people we might become, is foolhardy at best, 
dangerous at worst. If we do not want to envision a future with human 
clones we must ensure ourselves today that the technologically 
possible (even if as yet years from available) is not engaged. 
Tomorrow, the future, is today's business; ask any parent or financial 
planner for that matter about their children or their retirement fund. 
The future we fail to envision in the guise of a clone today will 
otherwise oppress us. 
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